Suzanne Lee and NAthan Lee Garza, through his guardian, Suzanne Lee v. Dr. Lynn Gaufin : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Suzanne Lee and NAthan Lee Garza, through his
guardian, Suzanne Lee v. Dr. Lynn Gaufin :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. DeBry; Robert J. DeBry & Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Elliot J. Williams; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lee and Garza v. Gaufin, No. 198620995.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1486
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
DOCUWHNt 
K F U 
,S9 1^7/) 9 75* 
DOCKET NO. -+°-LLL- IN ffHE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE 
GARZA, through his ] 
guardian, SUZANNE LEE, 
Plaintiff- 1 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DR. LYNN GAUFIN, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
» Case No. 20995 
1 and 
I Case No. 21063 
i Category No. 13.b. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Elliot J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
JUL 3 11986 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE 
GARZA, through his 
guardian, SUZANNE LEE, ] 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, ] 
vs. 
DR. LYNN GAUFIN, 
Defendant-
Re spondent. 
i Case No. 20995 
i and 
i Case No. 21063 
i Category No. 13.b. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Elliot J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
The Utah Courts are not 
Open to Nathan Garza 
POINT II: 
Nathan's Rights Were 
Arbitrarily Taken 
POINT III: 
The Anti-Tolling and Repose 
Statutes Violate the State 
and Federal Equal Protection Tests 
POINT IV: 
Heightened Review is Appropriate.... 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Arneson v. Olsony 
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) 9 
Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospitalf 
692 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1984) 2,3 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 1/2,8 
Bracken v. Dahle, 
68 Ut. 486, 251 P. 16 (1926) 8 
Carson v. Maurer, 
424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) 9. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 
598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) 2 
Heath v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 
464 A.2d 288, (N.H. 1983) 1 
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 
555 P.2d 399 (Id. 1976) 9 
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 
416 So.2d 996 (Al. 1982) 8 
Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) 4,6,7,8 
Mills v. Habluetzel, 
456 U.S. 91 (1982) 8 
Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) 4 
Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) 8 
Sax v. Votteler, 
648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) 2,3 
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 
568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977) 2,4 
Switzer v. Reynolds, 
606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) 4 
Szaval v. Sandoval, 
636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981) 4 
ii 
Page 
Utah Code Annotated: 
Section 78-12-36(1) 5 
Section 78-14-4 5 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 17 2 
Periodicals: 
"The Manufactured Crisis," Consumer Reports, 
August 1986 at 544 5 
Goldberg, "Doctors and Lawyers Face Off," 
72 A.B.A.J. 38 (1986) 5 
iii 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURTS ARE 
NOT OPEN TO NATHAN GARZA 
The defendant argues that the Medical Malpractice 
anti-tolling and repose statutes do not violate the Utah 
Constitution's Open Courts provision. The defendant argues 
that with no outright bar of minors1 claims, there is no 
violation. However, the Open Courts provision may be 
violated, even though no outright bar exists. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) , the Utah Supreme Court invalidated the Utah 
Products Liability statute of repose. The Court said that 
the statute violated the Open Courts provision. The statute 
did not bar all claims outright. Rather, it only barred 
claims which arose a certain number of years after the 
injuring product was manufactured or sold. The Supreme 
Court quoted with approval Heath v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 
464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983), to the effect that the Utah 
Open Courts provision contemplates that plaintiffs will have 
a sufficient time after a claim has accrued in which to 
file. Berry, at 673-74. The court, therefore, broadly de-
clared the statute unconstitutional because the plaintiff 
was "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to 
protect basic individual rights." Id. at 675. 
The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling and re-
pose statutes deprive Nathan and all other similarly situ-
ated minors of the effective remedies designed to protect 
their basic individual rights. Within the statutory limita-
tions period, Nathan did not have sufficient understanding 
to "discover11 his medical malpractice claim. Further, with-
out a guardian, he was legally incompetent to enforce any of 
his legal rights in a Utah court. Utah Rule of Civil Proce-
dure, 17. 
The protection of Nathan!s legal rights were left 
exclusively within the hands of his parents. However, many 
courts have recognized that minors1 rights often go unpro-
tected due to the inadequacies of their parents or 
guardians. See, e.g., Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977); Barrio v. 
San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 295-96 (Ariz. 
1984); and, Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 
1983). 
In states where an open court clause is 
interpreted to be more than a mere statement of philosophy, 
repose and anti-tolling provisions like those in Utah's 
Defendant clouds the issue with federal authorities 
and state cases involving different constitutional 
challenges. Even where open court provisions exist, not all 
states give them the meaning given Utah's in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, supra. (See page 25, footnote 2 of Respondent's 
brief.) Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) 
was decided before the Utah Supreme Court determined the 
scope of Utah's Open Courts provision in Berry. 
Medical Malpractice Act have been invalidated. Sax v. 
Votteler, supra; Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital, 
supra. These cases hold that such provisions unreasonably 
deprive affected minors of an effective remedy. 
It is factually and legally wrong to avoid the 
issue by claiming that Nathan was on an "equal footing" with 
an adult. Unlike adults which are granted some discovery 
period, Nathan had no real opportunity to discover his medi-
cal malpractice claim. Even if he could comprehend his 
claim, he could not turn the key to the courthouse door 
without an adult acting for him. Nathan's "effective reme-
dies" were taken from him by the Medical Malpractice Actfs 
anti-tolling and repose clauses. The Utah Open Courts pro-
vision has therefore been violated. 
POINT II 
NATHAN'S RIGHTS 
WERE TAKEN ARBITRARILY 
The defendant argues that the legislature may 
limit a minor's cause of action just as it does an adults. 
However, the legislature may not act arbitrarily without 
violating the Utah Open Courts provision and the Equal 
Protection provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling 
and repose statutes arbitrarily effect minors. They are, 
« 
therefore, unconstitutional. 
Children injured by health care providers suffer 
equally as much as those injured in other circumstances. 
However, the legislature refuses to protect claims of minors 
injured by doctors while protecting all other claims. 
Staleness, or loss of evidence, equally affects 
the trial of the negligent doctor and the negligent driver. 
However, the doctor is protected from a minor's claim, the 
driver not. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said 
that the staleness and fraudulent claims arguments should 
not defeat justice. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 (Utah 
1984); Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981); Myers 
v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981); Switzer v. Reynolds, 
606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, the application of the anti-tolling and 
repose statutes may bring to a final, unalterable conclusion 
the claims of children who are barely two years old. The 
effect of the law on minors is clearly arbitrary. 
The case of Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District, 568 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1977) supports the 
conclusion that arbitrary application of the anti-tolling 
statute violates constitutional protections. The defendant 
claims that plaintiff misapplies the case. The case clearly 
states however that: 
[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to 
the protection afforded by said Section 
78-12-36(1), U.C.A., 1953, (the tolling 
provision of the Utah Code) , in all 
cases, including notice requirements of 
the type contained in the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise 
is a denial of due process and equal 
protection. 
Id. at 748. [Emphasis added]. 
The arbitrary nature and effect of the anti-
tolling and repose statutes make them unconstitutional. 
Nathan Garza should have his day in court. 
POINT III 
THE ANTI-TOLLING AND REPOSE STATUTES 
VIOLATE THE STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION TESTS 
The defendant claims there is an insurance crisis. 
The defendant claims that the Utah Legislature acted in 
response to that crisis by passing Section 78-14-4. Whether 
a crisis exists or notf laws must not violate equal pro-
2 tection or other constitutional guarantees. 
Defendant misses the point of plaintiff's arguments by 
asserting that "Plaintiff also contends there is no medical 
malpractice insurance crisis." (Respondent's brief, page 
13.) To be sure, it is far from clear that an insurance 
crisis existed when the contemplated provisions were 
enacted. Even today, disputes exist over whether present 
increases in rates are caused by injured people being 
compensated for their disabilities or by poor management. 
See, "The Manufactured Crisis," Consumer Reports, August 
1986 at 544, (See Exhibit A) and Golberg "Doctors and 
Lawyers Face Off," 72 A.B.A.J., 38 (1986). But regardless 
of the existence of any such crisis, then or now, means of 
addressing the perceived problem must meet constitutional 
standards. 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah, 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court explained that a law must apply 
equally to all persons within a class. Furthermore, the 
statutory classifications and different treatment given the 
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Id. 
In applying the first prong of the equal pro-
tection test the defendant incorrectly identifies and too 
narrowly defines the class in question. The class in ques-
tion is all minors tortiously injured under Utah law. The 
Utah law does not apply equally within that class. As ex-
plained above, the Utah law protects, until majority, the 
claims of minors injured other than by medical malpractice. 
However, those injured by health care providers have only 
two years to commence an action. The first prong of the 
test is not met. 
Nor is the second prong of the test met. As 
discussed in the Appellant's Brief, children's claims make 
up a very small portion of the total medical malpractice 
actions. Furthermore, many of those are brought within the 
statutory period. (Appellant's Brief at 6-7; See also 
Respondent's Brief, at 10.) To eliminate such a small 
number of claims has no reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute; lower malpractice insurance rates 
and insure health care for Utah. Also, the court in Malan, 
supra, clearly stated that it was inappropriate to create 
classes of individuals simply to lower premiums. 
Defendant claims that the elimination of these 
rights are required to maintain the availability of health 
care in Utah. The defendant says that the insurance 
industry cannot anticipate the risk of claims delayed into 
the future. To allow delay will destroy the malpractice 
insurance industry says the defendant. Howeverf prior to 
the enactment of the anti-tolling and repose statutes, the 
insurance industry was capable of calculating the risks of 
delayed claims. In fact, the industry continues to 
calculate delay risks for minors1 claims, other than medical 
malpractice. The passage of the anti-tolling and repose 
statutes did not render the insurance industry incapable of 
calculating such risks. The defense argument is without 
merit. 
The severe treatment given minors injured by 
medical malpractice is an arbitrary and impermissible way of 
dealing with any insurance crisis. This is not a matter of 
second guessing the legislature. There simply is no 
evidence that long-tail claims of minors have any 
significant effect on the insurance industry. Obviously, a 
few less claims would be brought. But it is just as obvious 
that any insurance crisis would continue whether or not the 
repose and anti-tolling provisions existed. The legisla-
ture's determined effort to stifle minors' claims amounts to 
nothing more than destroying claims just to detroy claims. 
This is the type of incidious discrimination which our 
State's constitution prevents. Malan v. Lewis, supra. 
POINT IV 
HEIGHTENED REVIEW IS APPROPRIATE 
As applied to minors, the anti-tolling and repose 
provisions of the medical malpractice act do not satisfy the 
rational basis test outlined in Malan. Nevertheless, a 
heightened standard of review would be appropriate for this 
case. 
In determining the standard of review, two impor-
tant factors must be considered in this case. First, the 
right to bring a tort claim is a substantial right of con-
3 
stitutional dimensions under Utah law . Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., supra; Bracken v. Dahle, 63 Ut. 486, 251, P. 
16 (1926) . Second, the United States Supreme Court has more 
closely examined laws that discriminatorily effect minors. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 
U.S. 91 (1982). Considering the combination of these 
factors, the rational basis test is insufficient to protect 
the minors' rights. A heightened level o*f review should be 
applied. 
Of course, the degree of judicial scrutiny required 
under the Open Courts provision will be greater than the 
scrutiny involved under the United States Constitution's 
rational basis test. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra; 
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Al. 
1982). 
Other states have used heightened levels of review 
in examining anti-tolling and repose provisions in their 
medical malpractice statutes. See
 y Appellant's Brief at 
15-16; Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Id. 
1976); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); and 
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
As applied to minors, the Medical Malpractice 
Act's anti-tolling provision and statute of repose are 
unconstitutional. The provisions violate Utah's Open 
Court's provision and deny Equal Protection under both the 
state and federal Constitutions. The relevant provisions 
should be found unconstitutional. The case should be 
remanded for consideration on the merits. 
DATED this 3 / day of \/Jj/ 1986. 
ROBERT J. jflEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for/ Appellants 
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The manufactured crisis 
Liability-insurance companies have created a crisis 
and dumped it on you. 
W$MmH arch 23' 1980' W3S a 
•gggjPgJjjJ bright, beautiful spring 
£ £ ? £ * » • d a v *n Gillette, Wyo. So 
:::::::::::::fl::y:j| Alta Means thought she 
would do some cleaning in a cottage she 
owned. Her granddaughter, nine-year-old 
Dustina Rhodes, lazily tagged along. Sud-
denly, the tiny cabin exploded into an 
orange fireball, engulfing Means in flames 
and blowing Dustina out the door. The 
grandmother died a couple of weeks later 
from massive burns; the granddaughter 
survived but suffered severe burns. 
A spark had ignited a cottage bloated 
with propane gas—gas that leaked 
through a Honeywell V8280 valve on the 
cottage's room heater. That type of valve, 
the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion subsequently said, tended to jam 
open because of a defect in design and 
manufacture. The valve was recalled by 
Honeywell in 1985. Dustina Rhodes and 
Alta Means' estate sued Honeywell for 
their losses. They eventually settled for 
more than $l-million. 
Now the insurance industry and manu-
facturers are trying to pass legislation 
that could make it more difficult to ade-
quately compensate victims like Dustina 
Rhodes for their injuries. The push for so-
called "tort reform" is on at both the state 
and Federal levels. 
Insurers say legislation is needed to fix 
a "crisis" that has made many types of lia-
bility insurance costly—or even impossi-
ble to get. The insurance industry has 
launched a $6.5-million advertising cam-
paign and an intense lobbying and public-
relations effort to lay the blame for its 
financial problems on people who are 
injured, juries, or lawyers. 
The insurance crisis 
The current liability-insurance crisis 
began a little more than a year ago with 
skyrocketing premiums and cancellations 
of policies. 
G In New Haven, Conn., a chain of 
seven day-care centers affiliated with 
Yale University saw its liability insurance 
premium jump from $400 in 1984 to 
$2400 last year. 
Q In Brooksville, Fla., a general vas-
cular surgeon paid $5000 for malpractice 
insurance in 1984. In 1985, the rate tri-
pled to $15,000, and this year he is paying 
$38,000. The doctor is thankful he 
doesn't practice in Miami, where his rates 
would top $70,000 a year. 
El In Hammondsport, N.Y., the Bully 
Hill Winery has sharply curtailed its free 
wine-tasting because its insurance premi-
ums have gone from $3000 for $l-million 
in coverage in 1985 to $8000 for 
$500,000 in coverage in 1986. 
U Aetna Life and Casualty has 
recently dropped some 400 municipalities 
from its liability-insurance rolls. 
The increasing cost and declining avail-
ability of liability insurance affects every-
one. Police departments cancel patrols 
and cities dismantle playgrounds for lack 
of municipal liability insurance. Many 
obstetricians are leaving their field. The 
number of nurse-midwives could shrink as 
they, too, find it increasingly difficult—if 
not impossible—to obtain malpractice 
insurance. Doctors' escalating insurance 
costs are bound to show up in their bills to 
patients. Day-care centers could become 
less affordable as their insurance rate 
hikes are passed on to working parents. 
The cost of owning a condominium rises 
with every bump up in liability-insurance 
premiums. 
How it happened 
In its advertising and in most state-
ments to the press and the public, the 
insurance industry lays blame for the cri-
sis on lawyers, juries, or victims whose 
alleged carelessness brought on their own 
problems. Lawyers use the civil justice 
system "to right every imagined wrong," 
cries the Insurance Information Institute, 
an industry trade group. 
A more objective analysis suggests that 
the "crisis" is of the insurance industry's 
own making. A Washington state task 
force concluded last year that the crisis 
"is mostly a result of poor management 
practices by the [insurance] companies." 
In New York, a report of the Governor's 
Advisory Commission on Liability Insur-
ance said that "the industry's poor recent 
financial condition largely reflects self-
inflicted wounds." 
Insurance companies have two major 
sources of money to cover claims and 
make profits—the premiums policyhold-
ers pay, and the interest the companies 
can earn on money that isn't immediately 
needed to pay claims. When interest rates 
are high, insurance companies try to gain 
as many customers as possible, to bring in 
the premium dollars they want to invest. 
In the early 1980s, when interest rates 
topped 20 percent, insurance companies 
slashed premiums to sell as many policies 
as they could. 
"The insurance companies did anything 
they could to get money to put into the 
money markets," says Dennis Jay, a 
spokesman for the Professional Insurance 
Agents trade association. "They did not 
underwrite the business as well as they 
should have. [Underwriting is the science 
of assessing risk and" setting an appro-
priate premium to cover the risk.] But it's 
very tempting to get the money in today 
to earn 21 percent interest and worry 
about the losses later." 
In 1981, the property-and-casualty 
industry suffered a record $6.3-billion in 
underwriting losses (premiums collected 
minus expenses and claims paid). Yet 
there was no "liability crisis." Investment 
gains of $13.2-billion the same year still 
created plush net profits. 
The "crisis" came when interest rates 
dropped, slowing the rise of investment 
income. By 1984, the profit/loss picture 
had reversed itself. Underwriting losses 
of $21.5-billion exceeded investment 
income of $17.7-billion. Even so, the 
industry managed to show a small 
profit—in large part as a result of the tax 
benefits described on page 547. 
In 1985, underwriting losses were 
$24.7-billion, and investment income was 
$19.5-billion. Because of tax benefits, the 
industry again came out slightly ahead, 
but profits were weak. 
To right itself, the industry has taken 
two major steps. First, it has jacked up 
rates for all liability-insurance buyers to 
levels that not only cover current costs 
but, some critics charge, recoup losses 
from mismanagement in previous years. 
Second, companies have dropped lines of 
business designated as "high risk." 
When pressed, some insurance-indus-
try representatives concede that the 
effect of the business cycle on interest 
rates is a major factor in the present cri-
sis. 'The fact that premiums are going up 
at high rates is purely due to the cycle," 
says Sean Mooney, senior vice president 
at the Insurance Information Institute. He 
nevertheless maintains that the "lawsuit 
crisis" is the reason that some parties 
can't get liability insurance at all. 
An orchestrated campaign 
The insurance industry is trying to turn 
its crisis into an opportunity—a chance to 
press for one of its favorite objectives, 
"tort reform." In plain words, the indus-
try's version of tort reform means placing 
limits on the rights of injured people to 
sue for and recover damages. 
The latest round in the industry's long-
standing campaign began in early 1985. 
At that time, insurance-industry leaders 
already knew that a cycle-borne crisis that 
would necessitate jarring premium 
increases was brewing. The industry 
launched an advertising program aimed at 
U.S. opinion leaders—politicians, busi-
ness leaders, executives, and journalists. 
In June, 1985, John Byrne, then chair-
man of the board of. Geico, a major 
insurance company, told the Casualty 
Actuaries of New York that "the insur-
ance industry should quit covering doc-
tors, chemical manufacturers, and corpo-
rate officers and directors." Byrne also 
said, "It is right for the industry to with-
draw and let pressure for [tort] reform 
build in the courts and in the state legisla-
tures." 
By summer of 1985, insurance rates 
indeed started rising. As the varied group 
of liability-insurance consumers began to 
feel the squeeze, they started to complain. 
Through the second half of last year, a 
grass-roots coalition of doctors, munici-
palities, nurse-midwives, manufacturers, 
day-care centers, and others with insur-
ance problems came together. Many of 
them believed what the insurance indus-
try was telling them: that greedy lawyers 
and excessive jury verdicts were to blame 
for the increasing insurance rates. 
In early 1986, the Journal of American 
Insurance pointed to the tort-reform 
movement as a superb example of coali-
tion-building by the insurance industry. 
This March, the Insurance Information 
Institute announced a $6.5-million adver-
tising campaign to sell "the lawsuit cri-
sis." This second campaign, still in 
progress, is aimed at the general public. 
Print and television commercials talk 
about the possible demise of high-school 
football and other sports programs and 
suggest you write to the Insurance Infor-
mation Institute. If you do write, you get 
advice on how to influence legislators. 
Voters, the insurance people hope, will 
pass the message of panic on to their state 
and Federal representatives. 
Those 'high' awards 
Insurance-industry leaders say that the 
average award in product-liability cases is 
now more than $l-million. 
That figure—and many others used by 
the industry—is based on statistics com-
piled by Jury Verdict Research, a firm in 
Solon, Ohio, that keeps track of such 
things. The Jury Verdict Research statis-
tics, however, don't reflect reality very 
well. 
The statistics are raw data on initial 
awards by a jury, and that's usually not the 
last word in litigation. Cases are often 
appealed, and the appeals court may 
reduce the award or overturn the verdict, 
resulting in an award of zero. To avoid the 
uncertainty and added expense of an 
appeal, some plaintiffs and defendants 
agree to an immediate post-trial settle-
ment, which can be significantly lower 
than what the jury awarded. 
Trial judges also reduce jury awards. 
Indeed, the very first multimillion-dollar 
award on record ($3.5-million in damages 
won by actor John Henry Faulk in 1962 
for being blacklisted for his political views 
in the 1950s) was reduced to $450,000 by 
the judge. According to one study, done 
by the Rand Corporation's Institute for 
Civil Justice, half of the initial jury awards 
surveyed were reduced after the trial. 
The largest awards were the ones most 
likely to be reduced and subject to the big-
gest reductions. 
There are other important reasons why 
the average verdict numbers are, statisti-
cally speaking, extremely "soft." The 
Jury Verdict Research statistics include 
only verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. 
Cases that the defendant wins and that 
result in an award of zero are not counted. 
Cases settled before trial aren't counted 
either. 
One unusually large verdict can skew 
the numbers by pulling the annual average 
way up. Such was the case in 1978, when 
a jury awarded more than $127-million to 
a man who was seriously burned when a 
gasoline tank exploded in an accident 
involving a Ford Pinto. As a result of that 
one verdict, the average product-liability 
award in 1978, according to the Jury Ver-
dict Research, hit $1.7-million—up an 
astounding 285 percent over the previous 
year's average. But the trial judge later 
reduced the Pinto award to $6.7-million. 
Had the statistics accurately reflected 
Insurers are spending millions of 
dollars—including $6.5-million through 
the Insurance Information Institute—to 
sell the idea of a ''lawsuit crisis." 
CONSUMER REPORTS AUGUST 1986 
Good Advice 
runs in 
the family. 
Give your children the facts 
and fun of Penny Power... 
the Consumer Reports 
for kids 8-14. 
As a Consumer Reports reader, you count 
on good advice. Now, so can your kids, with1 
the good-advice magazine all their own: 
Penny Power. 
Each issue of Penny Power helps your kids 
become more confident about money. They'll 
learn how to start a budget. Discover ways to 
earn pocket money. Find out which products 
are best buys. 
And Penny Power is fun, too. Stories, 
comics, games and do-it-yourself projects 
help your child have fun while building 
smart buying habits that last a lifetime. 
So let the advice and the fun begin by 
ordering Penny Power today. A full year (6 bi-
monthly issues) is only $11.96. Or order two 
years for $19.95 and save $3.95. Simply 
mail the coupon below. 
r - 1 
I Mail to: Penny Power, Box 51777 j 
j Boulder, CO 80322-1777 j 
j D Please send a 1-year Penny Power i 
• subscription (6 bi-monthly issues J 
J at $11.95) to the child named below. I 
} D Send 2 years at $19.95. (I save $3.95.) J 
J • Payment enclosed J 
j Q Bill me later ! 
j Your name 5 
I Address I 
• City j 
| State Zip J 
I Child's name I 
• Age J 
I Address j 
J (if different from yours) J 
I City I 
• State Zip J 
J D Check here for information J 
I on school bulk orders. | 
I GUARANTEE If you or your child are not I | satisfied with Penny Power, simply cancel. | 
• You'll receive a full refund for all unmaited J 
1 issues. Allow 6 to 8 weeks for delivery of I | first issue. 5H6P7 1 
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that, they would have shown the average 
award in 1978 to be just 19.5 percent 
over the previous year, not 285 percent. 
It's best to look at median awards 
rather than average awards. To be sure, 
the average would provide the best gauge 
of the industry's costs—if the figures 
were trustworthy. But, as we've seen, 
average awards are disproportionately 
influenced by a few large verdicts—the 
very ones most apt to be reduced post-
trial. Furthermore, it's the median, not 
the average, that shows how the typical 
injured person is compensated. 
Between 1975 and 1984, according to 
Jury Verdict Research, the growth in the 
median initial medical-malpractice award 
has been less than the rise in inflation. In 
product-liability cases, the growth rate for 
median initial awards has exceeded the 
inflation rate, but not by much. 
The Rand Corporation's Institute for 
Civil Justice has tracked tort action in San 
Francisco and in Cook County, 111., which 
includes Chicago, since 1960. It has found 
that the median initial award, adjusted for 
inflation, stayed virtually level. 
The phantom explosion 
The explosion that claimed the life of 
Alta Means was real. The so-called "liti-
gation explosion" repeatedly cited by 
advocates of tort reform is essentially a 
myth. Under close scrutiny, many of the 
facts and figures cited by tort-reform 
advocates do not hold up: 
Assertion: The U.S. is in the midst of a 
"litigation explosion." 
Fact: Last year, the National Center 
for State Courts (a nonprofit group funded 
largely by the courts themselves) ana-
lyzed data on tort litigation in 20 state 
courts for the years 1978, 1981, and 
1984. Careful examination of the data 
"provides no evidence to support the exis-
tence of a national 'litigation explosion' in 
state trial courts during the 1981-84 time 
period," said Dr. Robert Roper, a project 
director at the center. 
The center's data show that the annual 
number of tort filings in 17 states studied 
rose 9 percent between 1978 and 1984. 
Meanwhile, population in those states 
rose 8 percent. While court filings in 20 
states did rise 14 percent between 1978 
and 1981, they fell 4 percent between 
1981 and 1984. 
The number of liability cases filed in 
Federal courts has increased significantly. 
But a single type of suit—damage claims 
related to asbestos—accounts for much of 
the increase. Last year, 4239 of the 
13,554 product-liability cases filed in Fed-
eral courts—31 percent—were asbesto-
sis cases. That's not surprising. Asbesto-
sis and asbestos-induced cancer result 
from many years of exposure; only in 
recent years have the consequences of 
long-term exposure become evident in 
debilitating illness and death. In CU's 
opinion, people who are suffering from 
asbestosis or asbestos-induced cancer 
(and the families of those who have died) 
deserve compensation. 
Assertion: Plaintiffs win million-dollar 
verdicts regardless of merit. 
Fact: Stories told to prove this point 
are, at most, isolated incidents, and are 
often exaggerated to the point of myth. 
Insurers like to cite their favorite horror 
stories—about large awards given to a 
woman who said she lost her psychic pow-
ers after a hospital CAT scan, or to a man 
who injured himself using a lawn mower 
to trim a hedge, or to a California vandal 
who injured himself falling through a 
school-building skylight. 
Such anecdotes typ-cally lose some 
important details and gain a few embel-
lishments in the telling. Take the case of 
the psychic. Both United Press Interna-
tional and Associated Press made much of 
the fact that Judith Haimes was awarded 
close to $1-million by a Philadelphia jury 
last March after she said that a CAT scan 
at Temple University Hospital made her 
lose her psychic abilities. That's what 
made the headlines. 
Buried at the bottom of both wire-ser-
vice stories was the fact that Judge Leon 
Katz told the jury to disregard that issue, 
and to base the verdict on whether the 
hospital was negligent in administering a 
contrast dye into her brain. The proce-
dure allegedly caused Haimes to suffer 
breathing difficulties, intense headaches, 
nausea, and incontinence. What the jury 
really decided was that the hospital had 
negligently caused Haimes's adverse 
physical reaction, not that she had lost her 
psychic powers. 
A Crum & Forster ad in 1977 referred 
to the man who used a lawn mower to trim 
a hedge, hurt himself, sued the manufac-
turer, and won. The tale has been 
repeated dozens of times in support of the 
notion that consumers injure themselves 
foolishly and then seek out greedy law-
yers to bring groundless lawsuits. But the 
story was purely apocryphal. Crum & 
Forster admitted that it had no reliable 
source for the alleged incident. 
And that vandal who fell through the 
skylight? There's some truth to that one. 
But the incident isn't as absurd as it first 
sounds. The skylight was painted the 
same color as the school's roof. The 
school district knew that situation was 
hazardous because a young girl had 
already been killed falling through a simi-
lar skylight at another school six months 
before. 
When a plaintiff receives a large award, 
it's usually for a very good reason. Jury 
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Verdict Research has on file 2094 cases in 
which initial verdicts equalled or 
exceeded $l-million during the period 
from 1962 to 1985. Of those, 71 percent 
were for such damages as paralysis, per-
manent brain damage, wrongful death, 
amputations, and burns. 
What insurers want 
Several proposals have been put forth 
by the insurance industry and its support-
ers in state legislatures. 
Limits on awards for pain and suf-
fering. Most industry-backed tort-
reform proposals do not attempt to limit 
the amount of recovery for economic 
losses such as lost wages and medical 
costs. However, limits are being proposed 
on compensating victims for the pain and 
suffering that results from an injury. CU 
believes that while those harms are diffi-
cult to quantify, they are nonetheless real 
and should not be subject to a fixed, pre-
set limit. A man confined to a wheelchair 
as a result of someone's negligence but 
still able to keep working at his regular 
desk job might suffer no lost wages, but 
certainly his quality of life would be 
affected. 
Limits on punitive damages. Puni-
tive damages, as the name implies, are 
imposed to punish a defendant for acting 
irresponsibly or with disregard for safety. 
CU believes punitive damages must be 
maintained in full force to help deter man-
ufacturers and others from irresponsible 
behavior. 
Elimination of joint and several 
liability. The legal doctrine of joint and 
several liability applies when more than 
one defendant is responsible for causing 
an injury. If one defendant cannot pay, the 
burden of payment is transferred to the 
other parties found to be at fault. 
Critics of the doctrine say that it 
encourages plaintiffs to sue multiple 
defendants, especially those with "deep 
pockets," such as large corporations, 
municipalities, and people who carry a lot 
of insurance.! Why;1 they ask,-should a 
wealthy defendant that bears only, say, 5 
percent of the responsibility for a mishap 
have to pay for most or all of the damages, 
simply because the other defendants can-
not pay? 
The question is a valid one, and the 
issue a complex one. But CU does not 
believe the doctrine should be abolished. 
Without it, there would be no mechanism 
to make sure victims can recover a fair 
amount for damages. If the doctrine of 
joint and several liability were eliminated, 
victims would be left holding the bag when 
those defendants able to pay succeed in 
shifting the blame to those who can't. 
Limiting contingency fees. Law-
yers who take on a liability or malpractice 
case typically work on a contingency-fee 
Why insurers love the tax code 
Between 1975 and 1984, the prop-
erty-and-casualty insurance industry's 
assets more than tripled, to $265-bil-
lion. Industry surpluses—assets left 
after liabilities are deducted—are at 
near-record levels of $64-billion. Both 
assets and surpluses have shown a 
nearly unbroken record of growth 
through the recent so-called crisis 
years. Over those same years, the 
industry has also enjoyed substantial 
profits. Part of the reason has to do 
with the industry's favored tax status. 
Here's how the system works: 
When a policyholder files a claim, 
the insurance company estimates 
what its ultimate payment will be and 
sets that money aside into a "loss 
reserve." The money may not actu-
ally be paid out for years, especially if 
damage disputes are dragged through 
the courts. But for tax.purposes that 
money is deducted as an expense. 
Using this privilege, companies salt 
away billions of dollars. 
Meanwhile, the insurance company 
invests the loss reserve in bonds, real 
estate, or the stock market, and gar-
ners a profit (The profit is taxable, 
unless it flows from a tax-exempt 
investment such as municipal bonds.) 
"As a result of certain tax advan-
tages, many property/casualty compa-
nies have not paid federal income 
taxes for a number of years and, in 
fact, have qualified for refunds," said 
Natwar M. Gandhi of the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office. "While prop-
erty and casualty companies had 
about $46-billion m underwriting 
losses from 1975ithrough 1984, they 
had about $121-billion in investment 
gains during this period, resulting in a 
net gain of about $75-billion for those 
years. From 1975 through 1984, fed-
eral income taxes were a negative 
$ J25-million, a rate of minus 0.2 per-
cent of the ne\ gain." 
Tti6 tax-revision proposals cur-
rently being considered by Congress 
woulrfmake little dent in the iijsur-
ance industry's tax privileges; they • 
wouldr however, impose a minimum 
tax on insurance companies. 
basis: They get a percentage of the dam-
age award, typically about 30 percent of 
the damages paid. If they lose the case, 
they get nothing. Such a system allows 
victims who aren't wealthy to obtain legal 
representation at little or no initial cost. 
At the same time, because attorneys are 
"investing" their own time and money in 
the case, they have an incentive to weed 
out frivolous or weak cases. Furthermore, 
it would create an imbalance if lawyers for 
injured consumers were subject to a form 
of price control while corporations and 
other large defendants were not limited in 
their legal budget. All in all, CU thinks the 
contingency-fee arrangement is an 
acceptable one. 
The wrong cure 
Clearly, however, the insurance compa-
nies' message is getting through. State 
and Federal legislators have passed or are 
considering a number of industry-backed 
tort-reform proposals, most of which 
would limit compensation to victims. 
Maryland, for example, has put a 
$350,000 cap on pain and suffering dam-
ages in personal-injury cases. Missouri set 
the same limit for pain and suffering 
awards in malpractice cases. 
In June, the New Jersey Assembly 
passed and sent to the state Senate a bill 
that would limit pain-and-suffering dam-
ages to $5000 for minor injuries, 
$300,000 for catastrophic injuries. The 
bill also sets a $500,000 lid on the amount 
a person could collect from a public entity, 
such as a county or municipality. 
In California, voters recently passed 
Proposition 51, which eliminated the legal 
doctrine of joint-and-several liability for 
pain-and-suffering damages. And the Flor-
ida legislature this June passed a bill to 
limit awards for pain and suffering to a 
maximum of $450,000. (The Florida leg-
islature, tied the measure to a 40 percent 
rollback in liability-insurance premiums. 
Within two days, six insurance companies 
had announced that they would no longer 
write new commercial liability insurance 
in the Sunshine State.) 
In New York, the Governor's commis-
sion recommended some changes in the 
tort system, such as modifying the doc-
trine of joint and several liability. CU's 
Executive Director, Rhoda Karpatkin, 
served on the commission and filed a dis-
sent. Nonetheless, a bill incorporating 
some tort-system changes—undesirable 
ones, in our opinion—was about to be 
signed into law as this issue went to 
press. 
The Reagan Administration has pro-
posed a sweeping package that could 
cover product-liability claims against cor-
porations, Government contractors, and 
the U.S. Government itself. The Reagan 
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plan, which Attorney General Edwin 
Meese called a response to "the crisis in 
tort liability" would impose caps of 
$100,000 on awards for noneconomic 
damages such as pain and suffering. Puni-
tive damages would also be capped at 
$100,000. In addition, the Reagan bill 
would limit fees that lawyers could charge 
in product-liability cases. 
Such tort-reform measures will not 
solve the insurance crisis. Indeed, similar 
measures have been tried in various 
places—with little if any effect on insur-
ance rates or availability. In Ontario, 
Canada, lawyers' contingency fees are not 
allowed and awards for pain and suffering 
are capped. Nonetheless, liability-insur-
ance rates in Ontario are skyrocketing 
and the insurance is hard to get—just as 
in the U.S. 
In hearings before state legislatures, 
insurance-industry representatives have 
declined to promise that the tort-reform 
measures they advocate would result in 
lower insurance premiums. Even if they 
ended the industry's self-inflicted crisis, 
however, such measures would still be 
repressive and undesirable, in our view. 
Adequate compensation for injured par-
ties is a part of our system of justice. 
The right cure 
The lawsuit crisis may be phony, but 
the insurance crisis is real. Towns, doc-
tors, day-care centers, and others face 
urgent problems of insurance availability 
and affordability. What is needed to alle-
viate the problem is not tort reform but 
better regulation of the insurance indus-
try. The Governor's Advisory Commis-
sion on Liability Insurance in New York 
has put forward several worthwhile rec-
ommendations for strengthening the reg-
ulatory system: 
H Price regulation. Insurance regu-
lators should do more to keep prices on an 
even keel, discouraging both excessive 
and artificial cyclical price cuts that 
endanger the health of insurance compa-
nies and excessive price hikes that create 
hardships for consumers. 
The Commission suggested that a state 
insurance department can achieve this 
goal in part by setting upper and lower 
limits on permissible prices that insurers 
may charge. That practice would help to 
avoid wild swings, while still giving insur-
ers some flexibility. As in any price-
regulated industry, insurance companies 
could request changes in the permitted 
price bands from time to time. 
D Limiting cancellations. The 
recent crisis atmosphere was created 
partly because of abrupt cancellations or 
nonrenewal of coverage by insurers. The 
Commission proposed that insurance 
companies be permitted to cancel or 
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refuse to renew coverage only in certain 
clearly defined circumstances, such as 
nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the 
part of the insured. A "major change in 
the scale of risk" assumed by the insurer 
would be a valid cause for cancellation or 
non-renewal. But presumably the insurer 
would have to demonstrate to regulators 
that the risk level had indeed become 
unreasonable. 
U Providing more resources. The 
insurance industry is regulated almost 
exclusively by the 50 states, even though 
the industry has been nationwide in scope 
for decades. State insurance regulators 
are typically understaffed operations that 
are responsible for more work than they 
can capably handle. 
Federal oversight is needed. But so 
long as the states have the responsibility, 
the state insurance departments need 
more staff, more money, and in many 
cases more legal authority. 
U Appointing a consumer advo-
cate. The Commission recommended 
that an individual be appointed to work full 
time representing the interests of con-
sumers before the New York State Insur-
ance Department. In light of the strong 
lobbying presence of the insurance indus-
try in every state, the suggestion is a 
sensible one for all states to consider. 
H Letting municipalities pool 
risks. The Commission suggested cre-
ating a structure whereby municipalities 
and other government bodies could share 
the risks of liability claims. Since one 
large claim could severely damage a small 
town, county, or government body, that 
suggestion makes sense. It's also consist-
ent with the theory of insurance, in which 
many parties share the risk of an event 
that will probably happen only to a few. 
In addition to those recommendations, 
CU also advocates three more. 
First, the insurance industry should be 
subject to both Federal and state antitrust 
laws (the laws that ban price-fixing), as 
most industries are. Under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, which Congress passed 
in 1945, insurance companies are all but 
exempt from Federal antitrust rules. That 
makes it harder to stop companies if they 
act in concert to raise prices for a particu-
lar line of insurance. 
Second, conflict-of-interest policies for 
insurance regulators should be made 
stiffer, in light of a U.S. General Account-
ing Office study finding that half of state 
insurance regulators either came from 
the insurance industry or found employ-
ment in it after leaving office. 
Third, state regulators should encour-
age insurance companies to offer eco-
nomic incentives to corporations and 
municipalities that follow good safety and 
risk-management practices. • 
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